A Retail Market Study of the Retail Space
This retail market study will look at the retail market as it stands today and the art of retail branding. We will look at the competitive positioning, brand promises, segmentation strategies and the influx of online retailing.
More importantly, we wanted to see what the trends are. Where is the retail market heading? And, with news of poor sales and store closings, where can retailers go from here?
Let’s begin by looking back because we can learn from it.
History of Retail Branding
Today’s retail market is in the midst of great changes. The current competitive set is under fierce competition from new and emerging venues. Yesterday’s winners may be losers today as the brands seek importance and place in the shifting sands of retail expression.
This dynamic of change is not a new occurrence in retail. Like the ancient city of Pompeii and the modern city of Napoli, retailers live next to a snoozing volcano of transformation. This volcanic giant erupts at historical intervals and its pyroclastic flow and unstoppable sea of lava changes the landscape in a flash of the eye. It leaves former populations stranded, frozen in time, and builds new terrains for the lucky survivors.
More than 200 years ago, populations were centered within metropolitan areas. Suburban living was rare and rural residents made their way to nearby cities when purchases were needed. Back then, required clothing was either unable to be made and/or unavailable in the general store. Those residents of cities and metropolitan areas shopped in retail districts, often defined by the type of product that was available. There were streets and avenues that were known colloquially as the shoe district, milliner district, haberdashers and others.
Like the advent of supermarkets in food retailing, where various store fronts were brought together under one roof (i.e. green grocer and butcher shop), convenience drove the birth of the department store. These eponymous mega-stores brought the shingles of merchants together in one place. Suddenly, it was possible to shop for hats, shoes, dresses, and outerwear all in one place. The lucky city shopper was able to save time as well as sample all the finest and utilitarian goods available.
This retail market was a global phenomenon. In Britain, Kendals, Harrods, Selfridge, Baimbridge and others took hold. As the space moved towards this powerful market economy, department stores arrived all over the European continent. Le Bon Marché, Karstadt, Magasin and countless others — each representing the needs of the local population.
In the US, retail giants took root and Gimbels, Macy’s, John Wanamaker, Lit Brothers, Strawbridge and Clothier, Lord & Taylor, Marshal Fields, Frederick and Nelson began. Many never morphed into chain stores. Marble Palace, in New York, was one of the first department sores.
As the population shifted to the suburbs from the 1940s and 50s, these large department stores opened chain stores in larger markets. Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward were the equivalent of Amazon today. They allowed for home shopping from catalogs for the most rural customers because it was a department store in a book. These not only brought all the departments under one roof, their more efficient buying power enabled them to offer pricing that put additional pressures on small specialty retailers.
As a result, cities all over the globe saw more and more independent specialty stores shutter their windows and close. The department store appeared to be an irresistible source.
Eventually, it seemed that every major city had a string of independent department stores. Check out the listing for now defunct department stores on Wikipedia, for example. The brands number into the hundreds.
About 20-30 years ago, there was a great consolidation of brands as holding companies like Mays and Federated swallowed up local stores. In some instances, the new store brand names were consolidated to just a handful. Eventually, great legacy stores like Hecht’s, Wannamaker’s, Strawbridge, Bamberger’s and others went the way of the Studebaker and either closed or became branded as one of the winners — like Macy’s.
The first real challenge in the retail market to department store dominance was from the value institutions. Two Guys, EJ Korvettes, WT Grants, Kressge, Kress, Woolworths Kmart, Clover, Aimes, Bradlees, Jamesway, McCrory, and others appeared. They siphoned off the value shoppers from the major main line department stores. Those stores today are represented by Target, Wal-mart and Kmart.
In the traditional department store model, retailers counted on the efficiency of a one-stop shopping experience. But they also quickly understood shopping as a recreational experience. Put simply, they accepted that shopping was for fun as well as utility. What these stores were doing was selling an experience. Lavish first floors, escalators, elevators, balconies, and also marble and imported features, raised the experience to the level of theatre.
From the siege of discount department stores mentioned earlier, the main line department stores learned the value of loss leaders and clearance sales. Part of the entertainment value was certainly the thrill of the hunt. The department stores heads quickly learned that, at certain price points, even the most experienced shopper was willing to buy something they did not really need. Why? Because the price was simply too good to pass up.
Today, in the retail market world, new pressures have arrived. Specialty stores are on the rise again because shoppers are looking for the unique and unusual. Population centers have expanded and almost every community can support a mall (that is, a centralized design predicated upon the idea that a city shopping experience could be brought to any community) and a discount retailer like Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target. But margins have eroded, discounting has become the norm, shoppers are savvier and the availability of online purchasing can fulfill the needs of the shopper. The thrill of the hunt can reside on your tablet or phone and when the shopper visits the department store they are aware of pricing and compare it to an online venue or a competitors web site live — even while in the store itself.
It is within this cobbled environment that we begin our retail market study. What does the future hold? How can any retail environment survive when most retailers are simply copying one another? At the end of the day, is price, discounting, and over-saturating the market the only game necessary playing? Are the department store websites eating their own young? These are just some of the many questions we will be contemplating through the course of this study.
A Snapshot of the Retail Market
As we’ve explained, the retail industry is amuck. Changes are afoot that retailers are having difficulty dealing with. We’ve seen Radio Shack, Barnes & Noble, Office Depot, Sears, Staples and Toys “R” Us close locations for a variety of reasons.
The entire retail market is so vast, we are going to concentrate on the apparel market. But even the apparel market sees retailers close locations, with J.C. Penney announcing 33 store closings by May and Abercrombie & Fitch to close 180 stores by 2015.
Like their retail brethren, the apparel retailers are in this pinch because they lack differentiation and their business models are outdated in a world of sea changes.
To begin, let’s map out how the retail market positions in the retail market itself. In the graphic below, you see the luxury retail markets (the Bergdorf Goodman and Von Maur’s of the world) existing on the top. This high-end section can blur into our middle-tiered players (department and specialty stores: Belk, Macy’s and GAP, for instance). The middle-tiered players blend into the value and discount retail providers (such as Wal-Mart and TJ Maxx).
The shoppers at Bergdorf Goodman would rarely go into Wal-Mart, and vice versa. The middle was intended to play to all shoppers.
In this paradigm, and because of their polar positions, luxury retailers and discount stores already come with a built-in audience. Those shoppers seeking exclusivity for the privileged and top designer fashion will frequent the high-end markets, while those seeking a value will hit the discount shop.
For example, Bergdorf Goodman offers a uniquely exquisite shopping experience. The store is uncluttered and displays recognizable products for the upper class.
In this region of the retail market, the shopper is readily defined and is willing to spend major bucks on the finest brands, quite happily. High-end stores represent a vision of either how they see themselves (elite) or how they aspire to see themselves.
The lowest sector of our retail market segment represents discount and value markets. It, like the luxury sector, also has a built-in set of loyal customers. Represented here are those seeking value, perhaps quantity, and locations close to home. (They, also like the high-end shopper, may seem themselves as smarter than the rest.)
Wal-Mart rules this portion of the market. The customer knows exactly what they will find at Wal-Mart, approximately how much they’ll spend, and can plan accordingly with their wallets. Same too with TJ Maxx, which offers fashionable brands at discounted prices, as well as Target and others positioned in this section.
This then leaves the largest portion of the retail market in and around the middle. Here we find department and specialty stores lurking about, but without any real defining factors that separate them from the other contenders – including those above and below them in this matrix.
Here’s the mess of what happening in the retail market
(Here is an article from the Chicago Sun Times about retail sales in November 2015) In this realm, the department store aims to steal market share from both the luxury and discount category. The lunacy in that is the only way these stores can gain market share is by way of discounting merchandise and building store locations nearby. That’s all.
Let’s take Dillard’s, for instance. When this department store comes to mind, we might think: “a bit upscale.” Maybe something along the lines of a Bon-Ton, but a little bit nicer. While that’s the thought, the message it advertises is quite murky. Dillard’s is marketing a preposterous mix of high fashion infused with heavy discounting and sales.
Basically, it is trying to be both luxury and discount. In that case, if you prefer luxury, you ignore Dillard’s because the luxury stores are right there next to it. If you prefer discount, you ignore Dillard’s because the discount stores are right there too. When you try to be everything to everybody, you end up being for nobody. You are undefined.
What this tells us is that Dillard’s (like any other department store that faces the same dilemma in the retail market) hasn’t found any singular means to identify itself, so it copies and hopes to steal a few customers from the high-end and low-end shops. It offers high-end fashion as a way to snag shoppers who may frequent the luxury stores (but that won’t work since the luxury shopper seeks experience), but also plays against the discount category by offering blowout sales throughout the year. Even Macy’s seems stuck in a world of tactics. Take a look at this Macy’s commercial from Black Friday 2015. All it demonstrates is no new ideas in the retail market.
Macy’s Black Friday Commercial
How about JC Penney as another example? Like Dillard’s, at JC’s we find some major brand names being offered for the shopper seeking a good sale. Our problem again is the need for the department store to pull from the luxury and value segment.
When JC Penney hired Ron Johnson a few years, it sensed the terrible trap it found itself. Johnson, the former retail chief for Apple, decided JC Penney was no longer going to offer discounted items. He, based on his experience at Apple, wanted to build a brand that shoppers sought out – even if they could get those items cheaper elsewhere.
With less than two years on the job, Johnson was fired by the JC Penney Board of Directors as the company lost $4.3 billion in sales and dropped 28.4% in holiday sales.
The problem JC Penney and Johnson faced is the same problem department stores are facing how. They are playing in the middle of the retail market and lack any kind of credible, singular identity.
To gain that identity, and steal share, these middle-tier retailers must become owners of a tangible concept. On a macro level, luxury and discount do this with experience and value. But on a micro level, nobody but Wal-Mart really owns cheap.
To break away from the set and highlight yourself as being different and better, each player within each segment must become known for something that is uniquely its own.
In simple terms, you must be known for something. Right now, the stores playing in the middle – trying to have a foot in one end and the other – are known for nothing. The high-end and discount stores (not to mention online outlets like Amazon) are pulling customers from them.
This is why JC Penney continues to struggle. It is playing a game in which what it offers is better served in other areas of the retail spectrum. JC Penney and those like it need to change its brand and business model.
When we look into the abyss of discount stores in the retail market, we can basically see one big winner and a whole lot of second-rate copycats.
Here’s the gist of the problem with the category. Wal-Mart has taken claim of a unique position and isn’t moving anywhere. It owns affordability and has become the destination for the shopper who wants it all under one roof — at a fraction of the cost.
Brands like Target (Read why Target needs repositioning) try so hard to be like Wal-Mart that they even sound like the low-cost retailer. Take Target’s theme, “Expect more. Pay less.” and Wal-Mart’s, “Save money. Live Better.” If we are to draw a line in the sand, the leader (Wal-Mart) is always going to be the winner. It is the consumer’s default choice. How is Target going to beat the competition if it is just copying what the competition does?
From the inside-out perspective of the stores themselves, the difference between Target and Wal-Mart is simple. Wal-Mart brands for everyman, while Target attempts to pinpoint an audience a bit younger, more educated, hip and affluent.
We’re here to tell you it isn’t working.
Target is just doing what Wal-Mart has done. There isn’t any mark of differentiation between the two in reality. For example, the same Apple products are offered at both. Food, and clothing, too.
So, how will Target ever win if it is doing the exact same thing the market leader is doing? It won’t. In the race to attract the discount shopper, copying the market leader always leads to second place or worse. That’s because when the reasons to choose are the same, the default choice is always the market leader.
Meanwhile, way, way off in the distance from successful Wal-Mart and semi-successful Target is Kmart.
In 2005, Kmart was taken on by the fumbling, Sears Holding Corporation. Following that came a series of failures: losing the Martha Stewart Living line in 2009 following comments made by Stewart that Kmart had “deteriorated” since merging with Sears (funny thing: she was right). Several years later, after dismal holiday sales, 100 Sears/Kmart stores closed.
Failure came to Kmart as a result of promising exclusivity of its product line. As an idea, that seemed right. But not when the Kmart brand itself is identified as downscale.
In some ways, this is about brand permission. When Kmart had an exclusive with the Martha Stewart line, the Martha Stewart brand suffered – meaning the exclusivity of it became meaningless. It is the Kmart brand itself that hampers sales, not what it offers. (It seems Kmart has yet to learn that. It now trots out the Adam Levine line.)
No celebrity line will work until Kmart fixes its own brand. It is definitely in need of brand repair.
TJ Maxx, Stein Mart and their shortcomings
The T.J. Maxx and Marshalls brands, owned by the TJX Company, appeal to shoppers seeking to save big bucks on big name brands. “If [it] says, ‘We like this $40 shirt you’re selling at Macy’s, but we want to retail for $22. We don’t need lining and we could use cheaper buttons.’ [it] will get what it asks because it will place an order for two million,” shared Howard Davidowitz, chair of the retail-consulting firm Davidowitz & Associates.
TJX now sports over 3,000 retail stores nationwide (a total which also includes the furniture brand, HomeGoods). However, just because it has a lot of stores and sales are up doesn’t mean the prognosis is good. TJX’s game plan to oversaturate the market with stores might be good for short-term sales figures, but that doesn’t build preference.
What does make the TJX companies different is its specialty products section. Unique to the smaller discount stores is the garage sale of goods in the back of every TJX store, where you can find name brand kitchen and home goods.
Remember this: distinct sections like these drive people into a store because they provide an experience unlike any other. At a TJ’s, you can get clothes for cheap, but you come for the cool stuff in the back.
Stein Mart, meanwhile, brands itself as an upscale boutique. We’re not entirely sure they are that, however. The theme of “More fashion, less price” is basically the mirror of T.J.’s, Marshalls, or Ross (“Dress for Less’) for that matter.
Their website offers all sorts of after holiday deals: “Save an extra 30% off” and “Red Dot Clearance” litter the site. Not exactly the upscale boutique feel, is its
Stein Mart still plays in the same area as its competitors – Brand clothes for less price. Playing in that area is not the problem. There is a tremendous market for that shopper, but being the same as the competition means you are not preferred.
Thinking discount as a whole for the retail market
Let’s call the discount store category what it is — a sea of nondescript imitators.
Right now, nobody stands for anything other than price. That’s it. The huge problem is that Wal-Mart solely owns the position of being cheap. So everyone else loses by playing the price game, too.
Even with the brand discounters, like Stein Mart, offering you a great 30%-off deal, it is basically telling you, “We have no identity worth sharing, but come buy our stuff anyhow because it’s cheap.” When Target copies Wal-Mart’s tagline, it is because it’s gasping for air too.
It’s high time these brands grew up. Or some of them are going to be gone.
These stores must own something beyond price, because Wal-Mart already owns it. The idea is to own something emotionally that gives consumers a reason to prefer you, the same way a pickup driver may describe himself as a Ford man.
Tactically, though, these retailers can be known for something that no one else has, such as gift giving. (And if you uncover the emotional reasons why gift giving is important, then you really have something.)
What if Target (or someone) added a “Great Gifts for Everyone” section in its stores? This could be a place where you could always find interesting, Target-selected goods that are perfect as a presents. Suddenly, Target now owns “Gift Giving,” which brings customers to the store. (Again, the emotional undercurrents of gift giving are what will make the brand.)
This section wouldn’t simply be like all the other sections in the Target store (clothing, home, electronics, etc.), but an entity unto itself. Perhaps it’s a separate room, with different lighting and style, even music. Target could hire specialists for this section — masters of giving great gifts, with a history of doing so. Store demonstrations and talks could be given.
Forget playing the price war. Sell this concept.
Change has to happen soon in this category or demise is afoot.
If you consider all the specialty shops stationed all across the US, which sector would you say does this:
• Owns an event that happens more than two million times per year
• Is part of a $40 billion industry
• Includes nearly 10,000 individual shops
What category would that be?
It would be bridal salons, from the biggest (David’s Bridal, Bridal Warehouse) to the local shops to the luxury ones you see on reality TV. They have managed to own an event, get customers to pay for an expensive dress they will only use once (the brides hope) and hunt all over to find the perfect one.
The shops are all in the considered set (within the realities of access). They all stand for something. And many of them even have preference, most notably because of past experience.
Why can’t the rest of the specialty shop market follow suit?
At first glance, it looks like many are, segmenting the market to own something. Urban Outfitters, Gap and Abercrombie & Fitch are for the young & hip. L.L. Bean and Eddie Bauer are for those who treasure the outdoors. Men’s Warehouse and Jos. A. Bank are for the formal male (at a good price) and these two have merged.
However, most of what they (and others) offer can be found elsewhere. Let’s recap a few of the players in specialty, and then examine what strategies they can employ to take more important ownership as bridal shops do.
Urban Outfitters aims to attract the young and hip of those among us. That’s fine as it goes. But as we’ll see, Urban Outfitters is not alone in trying to attract this audience. It has a cool, free-living factor. Even its “Lighten Up” message suggests that. And it takes a stab at promoting what it deems is its unique fashion.
As a holding company (Urban Outfitters also owns Anthropologie and Free People) it’s done well, but the Urban Outfitters stores are not growing as quickly as its other brands with net sales dropping. Urban Outfitters, as a brand, is so dependent on “trendy” that its performance fluctuates.
Keep that in mind. If you are “trendy,” then you might hit the game-winner every now and then, but you will also shoot an air ball. For long-term health, you need a consistent offense.
The first thing you notice here is that Gap is no longer The Gap. The “the” has been eliminated. Long the go-to place for young, hip fashion, Gap is facing more competition and, therefore, less market share.
The recent holiday season was a mixed bag for Gap, as sales soared on Black Friday but the retailer found customers less interested by December. Gap is doing better than the other two brands it owns (Banana Republic and Old Navy), but there are still problems.
Its marketing looks all the same as its competitors. If the Gap logo didn’t appear at the end, you wouldn’t be able to identify who the ad is for. They’re just so similar to what Urban Outfitters (and others) do.
Abercrombie & Fitch
Huffington Post recently released a list of nine brands that could be dead soon (its words) and, lo and behold, there was Abercrombie & Fitch. It cited a lack of variety among its clothes and high prices. Those may well be among the reasons, but it’s more than that.
You might remember A&F CEO Mike Jeffries’ comments last year that drew some Internet outrage. He said A&F was only for the “cool kids” and “only interested in people with washboard stomachs.” There’s more, but you get the drift.
Now, customers aren’t ignoring Abercrombie & Fitch simply out of protest to what Jeffries said. No, the reason is because, as a brand, A&F absolutely does think that way.
As we’ve seen, there’s simply nothing special about that kind of approach. It’s what everyone else is doing, and there’s something irritating about the A&F approach. It’s over the top in the washboard category. It’s a brand that’s trying too hard and it shows.
Not to belabor the point, let’s point out that there are others holding in a similar pattern, whether you’re talking about J. Crew or even Banana Republic, and move on.
There are other ways to segment the market. Many shops do speak to a specific lifestyle but only one seems to do something other than the blatantly obvious. That would be Lane Bryant.
Lane Bryant took some heat for its sexy TV spot, which is silly. In an era in which Victoria’s Secret is splashed all over the airways and Miley Cyrus is twerking, this approach isn’t so taboo. In fact, it delves into a deep, emotional belief that Mr. Jeffries of A&F has misconstrued: If I don’t have washboard abs, am I still sexy?
Lane Bryant is saying that you can be – and it’s working. Owned by Ascena Retail Group, Lane Bryant’s year-to-year, comparable sales in November and December increased by 13%. That’s impressive given that holiday sales were generally down for retailers. (Check out this blog with our comments on a Lane Bryant advertising campaign)
Meanwhile, the outdoor enthusiasts of L.L. Bean and Eddie Bauer have certainly found a stake in the ground, but they execute it in the most obvious way. Therefore, it’s not all that emotional or important.
One of the more interesting corners of the specialty retail market is men’s wear – specifically, the situations surrounding Men’s Wearhouse and Jos. A. Bank. The two retailers have been battling each other for years and it was nastiest before the merger.
In fact, Jos. A. Bank is being purchased by Men’s Wearhouse, ending a feud that was bloody. It even took out a founder.
The board of Men’s Wearhouse fired George Zimmer – and you all should know him. He’s the one with the gravely voice and beard that says, “You’re gonna like the way you look. I guarantee it.” The board believed the brand was too much about him and not about the products.
That’s true, but the new direction is blending into what other retailers are doing. You could say Men’s Wearhouse is becoming for those men who are young and hip. Sound familiar?
How to Win in the Retail Market
Before we take a look at what specialty shops can learn from the bridal salons, let’s take a step back and look at the apparel retail market as a whole.
As explained earlier in this study, retailers have mapped out a matrix in which consumers can decide where to go. There is the men-women line, intersected with the luxury-discount one. Consumers place themselves in the retail market as defined by the retailers.
The specialty shops sit over by the side. In general, they are more toward women and straddle the middle of luxury-discount. That is, they are in competition with the department stores.
Department stores are in predicament. They are so undifferentiated that there is no self-identification. They are not luxury. They are not discount. They are not specifically for men. They are not specifically for women.
Within the specialty shop space of the retail market, there is the same matrix and you’d find most in the middle, with a slight edge to the female side because most of fashion resides over there.
At the moment, most specialty shops define themselves by a style. A consumer chooses, theoretically, by that style.
But what happens when that style is available at many locations?
The solution: Be known for something that no one is known for. For that reason, it might behoove specialty shops to first consider where they stand on the luxury-discount scale.
That’s because most are in the middle, but there’s a certain advantage to being one or another. If you are high-end luxury (like, say, Saks Fifth Avenue), you know your customers are rarely, if ever, going to dip into the low-end, discount pool of Wal-Mart for clothes.
By the same token, those who primarily shop at Wal-Mart would not go online and look for clothes at Bergdorf Goodman. Much of that is economics, of course, but there are also two completely different emotional drivers for each segment. The luxury shoppers see themselves as always wanting the best; the clothes and accessories are representations of being elite.
The discount shoppers, meanwhile, see themselves as smart. They believe those luxury shoppers are being railroaded into thinking it’s more important to have the most expensive dress compared to discount shoppers who believe their money is best used elsewhere.
Therefore, the first step the specialty stores need to take is to position themselves on the luxury-discount line. If they stay in the middle, then they will continue to find declining sales as department stores play there as does online shopping. (You can always find what you want for a good price online, the thinking goes.)
The next step, and the most important one, is to own something. Right now, retailers are trying to own men’s clothes, young and hip, or outdoors. Young and hip, while having a relationship to fashion, is a cliché and, by itself, not that meaningful. Other demographics, like male or female, are simply reflections of what you offer.
Instead, you should own the reasons why your customers want to be young and hip, you would own an emotion.
Quantitative research would also determine what else you could own that is different – and more meaningful – than what the rest of the market is attempting to own.
That’s where you look to the bridal shops. They absolutely own something. An event. A season. A milestone. This sounds like more segmenting, but it’s really about positioning yourself against the competition that you are different and better.
For the men’s stores, for example, why couldn’t they own when you get that first professional job? The retailers would fear that that tactic would shrink your audience, but not really. If the emotional stakes are highlighted (you’ve made it), then your approach reached deeper and across more of the market.
Specialty shops are simply not that special anymore. They are lost in a quagmire of choices where everything blends into another. When that happens, sales fall short of expectations, stores are closed and irrelevancy sets in.
The Retail Market Summary
The current players in the retail market are in trouble. Sales are down, consolidation is the name of the game and competition lurks everywhere. Retailers aren’t helping themselves by producing the same, worn-out messages that depend on sales and clichés.
The retail numbers reflect that. While consumer spending rose .4% in January, the apparel retailers didn’t do so well. The industry is reporting weak sales in January, coming off a lackluster return during the holiday season as sales fell 14.6% on same-store sales industry wide.
The retail market and the retailers themselves are in full spin mode in discussing these two periods, saying the holiday season was shorter than in past years and that bad weather (especially on the population-heavy East Coast) kept buyers home.
Sure, those are factors but individual brands are suffering. Kohl’s reported a 2% drop in same-store sales, while Stein Mart had a .7% drop. Where are all the shoppers going?
To the Internet. Specifically, Amazon.
The Internet giant’s annual revenue has spiked each year, with total revenues expected to be reported at $75 billion for 2013.
Here’s what is strange: Amazon does not turn a profit, yet its stock is at record highs. In essence, what Amazon is doing – and what investors are counting on – is gobbling up more and more market share. To Amazon, the potential size of its market share is limitless.
And who is Amazon stealing market share from? Retailers, of course. The ones with brick and mortar stores, and their own e-commerce sites that can’t even begin to compete with the vastness of Amazon.
The retail market is changing, although at a far slower pace than how the customer is changing. Retail stores are not the destinations they once were as none of them can compete with the size of inventory the Internet offers.
The Internet, especially Amazon, has other advantages. It owns ease of use and even bargain shoppers can hunt down a sale through it. It can handle orders from across – and to – the world.
This is the truth. There’s simply no logical reason to go to a retail outlet in today’s technological world.
If retailers continue down their current path, here’s what will happen. The pace of closing stores will increase. We’ve already seen recently that Staples is closing 225 stores, RadioShack is shutting down 1,100 and so many others are bleeding money.
To turn a profit, retailers will close so many stores they will become irrelevant and become simply suppliers to large retail sites (Amazon, Wal-Mart). Or they will become the equivalent of a local specialty shop.
Amazon will continue to grow and retail brands will market their offerings as “available at Amazon.” CEOs will be fired. Companies will downsize and consumers will become even less interested in the brands themselves. All that will matter will be price, look and fit.
There will be further consolation as companies look to share redundancies, cut costs and increase their market space.
Wearing something from Gap (or any other retailer for that matter) will mean nothing. The department stores will have these huge retail spaces that are empty of customers, especially customers buying product.
Basically, the doomsday scenario.
If you don’t believe it, the evidence is all around you.
That means retailers must make some hard decisions. They must be known for something that goes beyond what they sell and how much they sell it for.
In this retail market study, we have recommended that the department stores become known for a department. We have recommended specialty stores remember that their specialty is not about a style, a brand of clothing or a price. But that their specialty is an event, which could be a season, a type of activity or a point in someone’s life.
Most of all, none of the retailers can continue to blur the lines of definition by spouting the same messages as the rest of the field. They must be truly different and better.
Despite what the retailers say, they are not. The major learning while Stealing Share strategists were looking at the retail market was how much it was full of blaring noise. Everything – from style to messaging to operations – ran together to form a ceaseless blob that consumers are increasingly tuning out.
The differences between retailers are as thin as blades of grass. It may be the most undifferentiated markets we have ever seen. That is why the doomsday scenario is in play for many retail outlets.
Think about this. Only 10 years ago, Gap was the 18th largest retailer in the nation. Last year, it was 33rd. The Sears Holding Company (which owns both Sears and Kmart) saw sales drop 9.2% in 2013. J.C. Penney’s dropped a whopping 24.7%.
We could go on and on. But the future is coming and changes must be made. Take heed. If you don’t, you will lose.